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The death of Europe? Continental fates after Ukraine 
RICHARD SAKWA 
 
On the outbreak of the First World War, Pope Benedict XV declared that the conflict represented 
‘the suicide of Europe’.1 A hundred years later we can talk of a new suicide, as the idealism 
associated with a whole era of European unification has been disappointed. European integration 
of a narrow and exclusive sort, of course, continues, but the transformatory goal of bringing 
together the continent on the basis of peace and justice has run into the sands. At the heart of the 
European Union (EU) is a peace project, and it spectacularly delivered on this promise in 
Western Europe before 1989. However, when faced with a no less demanding challenge in the 
post-communist era—to heal Cold War divisions and to build the foundations for a united 
continent—the EU evidently failed. Instead of embodying a vision embracing the whole 
continent, the EU is in danger of becoming little more than the civilian wing of the Atlantic 
security alliance. Critics argue that even its increasingly limited commitment to social and cross-
national solidarity is jeopardized by the planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP). The post-Cold War order has unravelled in numerous ways, and it is the purpose of this 
article to examine aspects of the European dimension to this breakdown.2 
In this article the putative ‘death of Europe’ is defined in three ways. The first is the exhaustion 
of the aspirations codified in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted at the second 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit of heads of government, 
meeting in Paris between 19 and 21 November 1990. The preamble unequivocally declared: ‘The 
era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations 
will be founded on respect and co-operation.’ Commitment to democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law were accompanied by respect for national sovereignty. The document insisted that 
                                                 
1 Benedict XV called for an ‘end to this most disastrous war’ in Ad beatissimi apostolarum, 
‘Appealing for peace’, 1 Nov. 1914, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xv/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xv_enc_01111914_ad-beatissimi-apostolorum.html, 
accessed 5 April 2015.  
2 For a broad overview, see Rajan Menon and Eugene B. Rumer, Conflict in Ukraine: the 
unwinding of the post-Cold War Order (Boston: MIT Press, 2015). 
  
‘Europe whole and free is calling for a new beginning’.3 The second is the transformation of the 
EU from a peace project based on an identifiable civilian agenda to a competitive geopolitical 
actor in which its own raison d’état competes with its normative commitments. The contentious 
absorption of territory and the struggle to create a zone of influence that displaces the previous 
orientations of states looks like the classic behaviour of an imperial power, although of a 
distinctive ‘neo-medieval’ rather than the classic Westphalian sort.4 The expansionist drive is 
generated by external demand as well as by classical imperatives to ensure security by 
neutralizing threats emanating from contested borderlands. Third, although Europe is certainly 
not to be identified with the EU, there is a broader crisis in the development of European 
continentalism. This is the vision of some form of ‘common European home’, to use the term 
introduced and outlined by Mikhail Gorbachev in his address to the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 6 July 1989, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok.5 
Instead, in the western part of the continent a ‘new Atlanticism’ is taking shape, combining the 
EU, NATO and American power, ranged against Russia and its allies in ‘Euro-Asia’. These three 
issues are overlapping and interlocked; together, they signal the danger of Europe’s becoming 
once again the ‘dark continent’, a characterization that a whole generation believed to have been 
transcended.6 
Russia, as so often, is the uncomfortable ‘other’. Even when weak and poor in the 1990s, it 
continued to claim the status of a Great Power, as demonstrated in its combination of competitive 
                                                 
3 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe 
(Paris, 21 Nov. 1990, http://www.osce.org/node/39516, accessed 5 April 2015. 
4 Jan Zielonka, Europe as empire: the nature of the enlarged European Union (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), and ‘Europe as a global actor’, International Affairs 84: 3, May 2008, 
pp. 471–84. 
5 Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘Europe as a common home’, Strasbourg, 6 July 1989, 
http://polsci.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/1A_Gorbachev.pdf, accessed 5 April 2015. 
6 Mark Mazower, Dark continent: Europe’s twentieth century (London: Penguin, 1999). 
  
and cooperative behaviour in the Balkans.7 When stronger and richer in the 2000s, its assertion 
of this status with increasing confidence challenged the Atlantic system’s claim to be benign, 
progressive and universal. No formula was found to bring Russia into the expanding Atlantic 
system, although this was not for want of trying. Russia was treated as an ‘other’ because 
ultimately it was not a straightforward rank-and-file member of the expanding Euro-Atlantic 
alliance system.8 At no point in its history since shaking off the ‘Mongol yoke’ in 1480 has 
Russia subordinated itself to an external power. From the western perspective, Russia’s 
combination of domestic governance problems, including the brutal suppression of the 
insurgency in Chechnya in two savage wars, and threats to the sovereignty and integrity of its 
neighbours, rendered it an unstable and ultimately a threatening force.9 From the Russian 
perspective, the country had quite legitimate security interests in its neighbourhood and in the 
region as a whole, and since it had initiated the end of the Cold War it deserved to become an 
equal partner in a restructured European security community. These views were not necessarily 
incompatible, and until the mid-2000s all sides sought to find a way to reconcile the divergent 
concerns. The question that needs to be addressed is why these attempts failed so spectacularly.  
The conflict in Ukraine that erupted in 2014 is the most vivid manifestation of the failure to 
create a stable and durable European security order, but ultimately it is only a symptom of that 
failure. This article will not go into the details of Ukrainian events, which I have analysed 
                                                 
7 For an exploration of Russian ‘greatpowerness’, see Hanna Smith, Russian greatpowerness: 
foreign policy, the two Chechen wars and international organisations (Helsinki: University of 
Helsinki Faculty of Social Sciences, 2014). 
8 Vladimir Baranovsky, ed., Russia and Europe: the emerging security agenda (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press/Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1996), and ‘Russia: a part of 
Europe or apart from Europe?’, International Affairs 76: 3, May 2000, pp. 443–58. 
9 For an exploration of these issues, see Iver B. Neumann, ‘Russia as a Great Power, 1815–
2007’, Journal of International Relations and Development 11: 0{?}, 2008, pp. 128–51, and 
‘Entry into international society reconceptualised’, Review of International Studies 37: 2, 2011, 
pp. 463–84. 
  
elsewhere,10 but will instead provide a framework for the analysis of the palpable and dangerous 
breakdown of the post-Cold War European security order. In place of the standard and, in my 
view, inadequate arguments concerning Russian expansionist motivations for its Ukraine policy, 
I will outline a more complex structural approach{1}. The failure to create a mutually acceptable 
European security system derived from the asymmetrical end of the Cold War and gave rise to 
the quarter-century of what President Boris Yeltsin identified as early as December 1994 as the 
‘cold peace’.11 Systemic tensions (the ‘regime question’, in other words, the nature of the 
Russian political system and its compatibility with Western liberal democracies,{2} accompanied 
by ‘values’ issues), incompatible identities, struggles for hegemony, institutional inertia and 
differing visions of the future combined to disappoint those who believed that Europe had finally 
put an end to its internal divisions, and thereby to the spectre of war on the continent.  
 
The end of illusions 
There has been no shortage of warnings that the post-Cold War peace order in Europe was 
fragile, exclusive and unsustainable. There were clear elements of what E. H. Carr identified in 
the interwar period as the ‘twenty years’ crisis’, with advocacy of peace and normative agendas 
accompanied by a new version of the punitive dynamic of the Treaty of Versailles of June 
1919.12 Despite the noble declarations at the end of the Cold War, Russian commentators have 
endlessly pointed out precisely that ‘Versailles’ element in the new peace system. This viewpoint 
is eloquently summarized by Sergei Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and 
International Affairs at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and Honorary Chairman of 
                                                 
10 Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: crisis in the borderlands (London and New York: I. B. 
Tauris, 2015). 
11 Norman Kempster and Dean E. Murphy, ‘Broader NATO may bring “cold peace”, Yeltsin 
warns: Europe: Russian President accuses U.S. of being power hungry. Speech comes as nations 
finalize nuclear treaty’, Los Angeles Times, 6 Dec. 1994, http://articles.latimes.com/1994-12-
06/news/mn-5629_1_cold-war, accessed 5 April 2015. 
12 Richard Sakwa, ‘“New Cold War” or twenty years’ crisis?: Russia and international politics’, 
International Affairs 84: 2, March 2008, pp. 241–67.  
  
the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP). Explaining the breakdown in relations 
between Russia and the West{3} in 2014, he argues: 
<ext>The main reason for Russia’s turn is the West’s refusal to recognize the place in European 
and global politics, which Moscow considers natural and legitimate. The West has been trying to 
act as a victor while refusing to accept this position of Russia, and to pursue a Versailles policy 
de facto, albeit in ‘velvet gloves’; that is, avoiding direct annexations and reparations{4} but 
continuously limiting Russia’s freedom, spheres of influence and markets and at the same time 
expanding the area of its own political and military zone of control through NATO enlargement, 
and its political and economic zone of influence through EU expansion.13<extend> 
<fl>This is a classic expression of the asymmetrical end of the Cold War. In Karaganov’s view, 
Russia was treated as a defeated power, even though the country did not see itself as such, and 
was assigned a modest role in world affairs. In the end, he insists, this provoked a type of 
‘Weimar syndrome’ in a country whose dignity and interests had been ignored. 
The argument has become standard across the Russian political spectrum, with the exception of a 
marginalized group of liberal westernizers. It has been advanced by none other than Gorbachev, 
the architect of the end of the Cold War. As early as 2000 he noted: ‘Apparently, the West is 
incapable of dealing in a reasonable way with the results of the new thinking that freed the world 
from bloc politics and total confrontation.’14 This prompted him to endorse President Vladimir 
Putin’s policies in 2014, including ‘reunification’ with Crimea, signalling the end of the era of 
optimism born of perestroika in the late 1980s. From this perspective, at the end of the Cold War 
the West had lacked a grand strategy to unite the continent, and instead had continued through 
inertia to extend its own institutions and structures. Russia ultimately was considered too weak 
and too marginal to force a substantive change, and by the time Russia became stronger, it was 
already too late.15 
                                                 
13 Sergei Karaganov, ‘2014: Predvaritel’nye itogi’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 28 Nov. 2014, p. 11. 
14 Mikhail Gorbachev and Daisaku Ikeda, Moral lessons of the twentieth century: Gorbachev and 
Ikeda on Buddhism and communism (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), p. 147. The original Russian 
version was published in 2000. 
15 For a useful overview, see Edward W. Walker, ‘Between East and West: NATO enlargement 
and the geopolitics of the Ukraine crisis’, in Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Richard 
  
It was ultimately no accident that the new Sarajevo would be found in Kyiv. Russia and Ukraine 
had long been on divergent paths of development, with the predominant model of Ukrainian 
nation-building predicated on separation from Moscow. In Russia, Putin had imposed a new 
‘social contract’ on the oligarchs, humbled the ‘barons’ in the regions and enjoyed an extended 
period of booming energy rents, whereas Ukraine every few years endured societal upheaval and 
political crisis in a system distorted by oligarchic power. By the time Putin returned to the 
presidency in May 2012 Russia was much stronger, and ready to assert itself in world politics. 
What Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes represent in structural terms as the ‘missing quadrant’ was 
being filled in: a strong but ‘bad’ Russia, not the weak and good Russia of the 1990s, the weak 
and bad Russia presented by its critics, or the good and strong Russia extolled by its friends.16 In 
response to the problems exposed by the ‘five-day’ Georgian war of August 2008, the armed 
forces became the object of a grand programme of reform and re-equipping. Russia under Putin 
presented itself as not so much anti-western as a complement to the West: a type of ‘neo-
revisionism’ that sought not to change the fundamentals of international order but to ensure that 
Russia and other ‘rising’ powers were treated as equals in that system. 
A very different narrative is advanced in the West. This is put most eloquently by Ivan Krastev 
and Mark Leonard, who argue that the events of March 2014 (the annexation and/or 
repatriation{5} of Crimea) signalled the retreat of Europe’s post-modern order and the end of the 
post-Cold War European order in general.17 In this analysis, old ideas about the balance of 
power, imperial aggrandizement and the practices of geopolitics had come to an end, to be 
replaced by the interpenetration of domestic and foreign policy matters, the increasing porosity 
of borders, and universalistic ambitions to apply the new normativity to the rest of the world. The 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sakwa, eds, Ukraine and Russia: people, politics, propaganda and perspectives, E-International 
Relations, 6 March 2015, pp. 141–54, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/03/06/edited-collection-ukraine-
and-russia-people-politics-propaganda-perspectives/, accessed 5 April 2015. 
16 Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, ‘Ukraine, NATO enlargement and the Geithner 
doctrine’, 10 June 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/06/10-ukraine-nato-
geithner-doctrine-gaddy-ickes, accessed 5 April 2015. 
17 Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, The new European disorder (London: European Council on 
Foreign Relations, Nov. 2014), p. 1. 
  
European project, in this reading, is both ‘exceptional and universal’, which ‘made it impossible 
for Europeans to accept any alternative integration projects in their continent’. Locked in their 
‘post-modern ecosystem, Europeans lost their curiosity about how Russia sees the world and its 
place in it’.18 Above all, blinded by its own success, ‘the EU also failed to grasp that what they 
saw as a benevolent—almost herbivorous—power could be viewed by others as a threat’.19 This, 
too, is a structural reading of the divergence in perspectives and identity between the EU and 
Russia. The substantive claim to normative superiority undermined the EU’s ability to engage 
with others in Europe on the basis of sovereign equality. The EU, like the Atlantic system as a 
whole, became increasingly ‘hermetic’—insulated from the genuine need to engage with the 
concerns of others by the grandeur of its own internal project (and the no less grand scale of its 
own internal challenges). 
This meant that diplomacy, in the traditional sense of a process of give-and-take to achieve a 
bargaining outcome that is reasonably satisfactory to both parties, gave way to the one-way 
channelling of already agreed postulates. Specifically, the current 35 chapters of the acquis 
communautaire facing countries seeking accession to the EU can be modified only, at most, at 
the margins. For most countries enthusiastic about membership, this model represents a welcome 
liberation from their own burden of history, malfeasance and poor governance. However, this 
model of ‘external governance’ is potentially hazardous when applied, however residually, to 
countries who whether by choice or necessity are not candidates.20 The political subjectivity of 
others is inevitably denigrated if they fail to subordinate themselves to the EU’s logic of 
normative superiority, precluding the normal diplomatic intercourse between two sovereign 
entities. Thus the focus of international relations is shifted to the systemic level. This is 
accompanied by endless controversies about ‘values’, which to the country at the receiving end 
                                                 
18 Krastev and Leonard, The new European disorder, p. 2. 
19 Krastev and Leonard, The new European disorder, p. 3. 
20 Sandra Lavenex, ‘EU external governance in “wider Europe”’, Journal of European Public 
Policy 11: 4, 2004, pp. 680–700; Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘EU rules beyond 
EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics’, Journal of European Public 
Policy 16: 6, 2009, pp. 791–812. 
  
appears intrusive and ultimately less about concern over human rights than about the assertion of 
normative hegemony. 
For Russia this shift in the conduct of international politics proved disastrous. Caught up in an 
extended period of post-communist transformation and marred by grave governance problems, 
Russia would inevitably score badly on this scale. Not surprisingly, its leadership sought to 
separate domestic issues from foreign relations, but for the EU the holistic approach is the very 
essence of its engagement with European states.21 Russia’s resentment at being treated in this 
way, and its appeal to normative pluralism, consigned it in the EU’s eyes—quite logically from 
the latter’s perspective—to the category of the regressive and unenlightened. For Russia, its 
critique of western ‘hegemonism’, ‘double standards’ and the asymmetrical quality to the post-
Cold War peace was considered something objective and totally separate from domestic issues. 
These incompatible readings of the structure of international politics generated the ‘values’ gap 
that in the end torpedoed substantive productive relations. This fundamental contradiction in 
European development was exacerbated by the absence of any mode of reconciliation between 
the different perspectives. The structural contradictions were not mediated by diplomacy, a 
return to the nineteenth-century Concert of Powers, Yalta-style summitry, or even the dense 
network of international governance, epitomized above all by the United Nations. It was this 
combination of conditions that led in the end to the crisis of 2014 and the breakdown of the 
European security order. 
 
Two visions of Europe 
Two visions of Europe have long been in contention. Timothy Garton Ash identified a clash 
within the EU between Euro-Atlanticism and Euro-Gaullism;22 however, the tension is not 
                                                 
21 On contrasting identity issues, see Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘Europe: self-alignment in time and 
space’, Russia in Global Affairs, 9 Aug. 2008, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_11285, 
accessed 5 April 2015; and, for a more extensive analysis, the same author’s Russia’s 
postcolonial identity: a subaltern empire in a Eurocentric world (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015). 
22 Timothy Garton Ash, Free world: why a crisis of the West reveals the opportunity of our time 
(London: Penguin, 2005). 
  
confined to the debate within the EU but represents a cleavage between two very different 
representations of Europe that profoundly affects the quality of political relations among the key 
actors. The first is wider Europe, the idea of the continent centred on the EU. European space is 
represented as Brussels-focused, with concentric rings emanating from the west European 
heartlands of European integration. In the 1950s this was a project designed to ensure that France 
and Germany would never again come to war, accompanied by a vision of a ‘social Europe’ 
motivated by Roman Catholic social philosophy. What became the EU was inspired by two 
fundamental ideas: to transcend the logic of conflict while restoring the statehood of its 
members; and to ensure equitable well-being for its citizens. Since the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome by the six founding members of the European Economic Community on 25 March 1957, 
the association has grown to encompass at present 28 members, with the latest entrants coming 
from the former communist part of the continent. The wider Europe is at the same time deeply 
embedded in the Atlantic community, which for good or ill obscures the specifically European 
component. 
The east European countries sought liberal democracy, market reform and, above all, the ‘return 
to Europe’. The accession wave of May 2004 included not only the central and east European 
states of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, but also the Baltic 
republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (together with the Republic of Cyprus and Malta); 
these were joined in 2007 by Bulgaria and Romania, and in July 2013 by Croatia. There were 
domestic debates, setbacks and contradictions, but overall a remarkable public consensus 
prevailed. Political, social and geopolitical goals coincided, allowing all these countries to join 
the expanded Atlantic community over a remarkably short period of time. This was an 
exemplary manifestation of the ‘wider Europe’ model of development, and it has undoubtedly 
delivered substantial (although not always uncontested) benefits to the countries concerned. It is 
these benefits that Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine now seek, although in these contested ‘lands 
in between’ there is no longer the same coincidence of domestic aspirations and geopolitical 
orientations. The ‘European choice’ is, paradoxically, precisely not European—it is Atlanticist. 
The EU-centred wider Europe is becoming subsumed into the Atlantic system, compromising in 
the view of critics its own normative foundations and imbuing its policies with a geopolitical 
dynamic that the EU had been established precisely to transcend. 
  
Wider Europe is challenged by a second vision: the idea of greater Europe. Even before the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Gorbachev had issued the manifesto for this model of 
Europe when he spoke of the ‘common European home’. This would be a continent united in its 
systemic diversity, since at the time when Gorbachev introduced the concept he believed that the 
Soviet Union would develop on the basis of a ‘humane, democratic socialism’. Instead of 
concentric rings emanating from Brussels, weakening at the edges but nevertheless focused on a 
single centre, the idea of greater Europe posits a multipolar continent, with more than one centre 
and without a single ideological flavour.23 Thus Moscow, Ankara and, possibly, Kyiv would be 
centres in their own right, allied with wider Europe but retaining a multidimensional set of 
interactions of their own. This is a more pluralistic representation of European space, and draws on 
a long tradition from Giuseppe Mazzini’s idea of a ‘United States of Europe’ through Richard 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s notion of pan-Europa between the world wars, Gaullist ideas of a broader 
common European space from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Gorbachev’s dream of a common 
European home transcending the bloc politics of the Cold War era, Nicholas Sarkozy’s return to 
the idea of pan-Europa,24 and the Valdai Club’s idea of a ‘Union of Europe’. The ‘greater 
Europe’ idea also has deep popular and elite resonance in the three Slavic countries in the 
borderlands of Europe (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus){6}, where it is complemented by discourses 
of ‘Europe’ and ‘alternative Europe’. Stephen White and Valentina Feklyunina are sharply 
critical of the EU’s identification of itself as ‘Europe’ and the attempt to impose its values and 
acquis on the region. Instead, they call for the acknowledgement of a plurality of ‘Europes’ and 
                                                 
23 Aleksei A. Gromyko and V. P. Fëdorova eds, Bol’shaya Evropa: Idei, real’nost’, perspektivy 
(Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 2014). 
24 In his European parliamentary election speech in Nîmes on 5 May 2009, Sarkozy argued that 
Turkey ‘is not intended to become an EU member’, but in a notable innovation he placed Russia 
and Turkey on an equal footing, noting that both countries should establish ‘an economic and 
security common area’ with the EU. A new bloc would thus be created ‘of 800 million people who 
share the same prosperity and security’.  In this system ‘Russia should not consider itself an 
adversary of Europe but a partner’. ‘Déclaration de M Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la 
République, sur l’action de la France en faveur de la construction européenne, à Nîmes le 5 Mai 
2009’, http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/097001329.html, accessed 7 April 2015. 
  
the search for accommodation (what I term a ‘mode of reconciliation’) between them that 
respects the diversity of traditions.25 
This picture of competing visions of Europe{7} forces some rethinking about a new interpretation 
of pan-Europeanism in the post-Cold War era. As Yeltsin put it: ‘Europe without Russia is not 
Europe at all. Only with Russia can it be a greater Europe, with no possible equal anywhere on the 
globe.’26 In other words, Russia could help Europe fulfil its potential. Equally, Russia’s vast but 
relatively underdeveloped resources and developmental contradictions needed western Europe’s 
advanced technologies and managerial capacity. The two complemented each other. To facilitate a 
positive interaction, an appropriate political form needed to be devised—but this was not found  
during the quarter-century of the cold peace. While the Russian leadership expended considerable 
effort on devising ideas for a new ‘architecture’ for a united Europe, the other countries saw no 
need for new ideas, since as far as they were concerned ‘wider Europe’ was a perfectly viable 
model, complemented not by Russia but by the United States. 
As Russia’s estrangement from the ‘wider Europe’ project intensified, it placed ever greater 
emphasis on plans for a greater Europe. The idea of a new European Security Treaty, announced 
by Medvedev in a speech in Berlin on 5 June 2008, called for the creation of a genuinely inclusive 
new security order, arguing that new ideas were required to ensure that dividing lines were not 
once again drawn across the continent.27 The initiative was greeted with polite condescension by 
the Atlantic powers, although the OSCE established the ‘Corfu process’ to assess the proposal. In a 
speech in Berlin on 26 November 2010 Putin called for the geopolitical unification of all of 
                                                 
25 Stephen White and Valentina Feklyunina, Identities and foreign policies in Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus: the other Europes (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).  
26 Cited by Leonid Bershidsky, ‘No illusions left, I’m leaving Russia’, Moscow Times, 19 June 
2014. 
27 Dmitry Medvedev, ‘Speech at meeting with German political, parliamentary and civic 
leaders’, Berlin, 5 June 2008, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_20215
3.shtml, accessed 5 April 2015. 
  
‘greater Europe’ from Lisbon to Vladivostok to create a genuine ‘strategic partnership’.28 Rather 
surprisingly, given the rapid advance of Eurasian integration, Putin returned to the idea of creating 
a free trade zone from the Atlantic to the Pacific at the Russia–EU summit in Brussels on 28 
January 2014 (as it turned out, the last of the series).29 In his meeting with Russian ambassadors on 
1 July 2014 Putin suggested that Europe’s security problems could be resolved by creating a 
‘single economic and humanitarian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok’.30 Putin’s insistence that 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was not an alternative but a complement to European 
integration echoed Gorbachev’s ideal of a united continent. Putin insisted that the plan was not to 
‘fence ourselves off from anyone’, but to found an institution on ‘universal integrative principles as 
an inalienable part of greater Europe, united by mutual values of freedom, democracy and market 
rules’.31 
In the event, Russia’s various initiatives in favour of the greater European agenda gained little 
traction in the West, typically being dismissed as being little more than a cover for the 
establishment of a ‘greater Russia’ by stealth, while ‘greater European’ ideas mostly remained 
vague and nebulous. The Atlantic community remains intensely vigilant against attempts to ‘drive 
a wedge’ between its two wings, but this has foreclosed the exploration of options that might have 
                                                 
28 Speech delivered to the Fourth Berlin Economic Leadership meeting organized by the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, which was presented as an article in the previous day’s edition of the paper. 
A summary of the speech is at http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/13120/, accessed 5 April 2015; 
the article is Wladimir Putin, ‘Von Lissabon bis Wladiwostok. Handelspakt zwischen Russland 
und Europa: Moskau will als Lehre aus der größten Krise der Weltwirtschaft seit acht 
Jahrzehnten wesentlich enger mit der Europäischen Union zusammenarbeiten’, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 25 Nov. 2010. 
29 Vladimir Putin, ‘Russia–EU summit’, 28 Jan. 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6575, 
accessed 5 April 2015. 
30 Vladimir Putin, ‘Soveshchanie poslov i postoyannykh predstavitelei Rossii’, 1 July 2014, 
http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/46131, accessed 8 July 2014. 
31 Vladimir Putin, ‘Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlya Evrazii: budushchee, kotoroe rozhdaetsya 
segodnya’, Izvestiya, 4 Oct, 2011, p. 1, http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/16622, accessed 5 
April 2015. 
  
enhanced the security of all. The Cold War fear of dissolution is accompanied by the hermetic 
concern to guard against potentially divisive and dangerous ideas emanating from outside the 
Atlantic alliance. Nonetheless, Atlanticism is permanently challenged by one version or another of 
the greater European idea. Even the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, referred to greater Europe 
at the 51st Munich Security Conference on 7 February 2015, insisting that there could be no 
military solution to the crisis in Ukraine and arguing that peace in Europe could only be secured 
with Russia rather than against it.32 The development of greater Europe remains a way of 
negotiating what in the best of circumstances is a complex and difficult relationship between 
Russia and the Atlantic community while ensuring space for the sovereign development of the 
lands in between. 
 
The EU, Russia and Atlanticism 
The failure to generate a mode of reconciliation between contrasting views of the world, 
including the Atlanticist and continental visions, meant that the EU’s relations with Russia were 
problematic from the beginning, and became only more so with the passage of time. The two 
entities existed, as it were, in different temporal realities (the Krastev–Wilson argument); or, as 
those taking a more Marxist approach would argue, at very different stages of development. 
Sergei Prozorov has demonstrated that the relationship was built not on the basis of sovereign 
equality but on the tutelary principle of teacher and pupil.33 The practical expression of this was 
evident in the way that the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia (CSR) of 1999 was devised: 
despite some early contacts with Russian officials, it ‘was nevertheless very much a unilateral 
exercise’. There was not much that was ‘common’, ‘in the sense that they are the result of mutual 
                                                 
32 ‘Statement and discussion with Dr Angela Merkel’, 
https://www.securityconference.de/en/media-library/video/single/statement-and-discussion-with-
dr-angela-merkel/, accessed 5 April 2015. For analysis, see Ben Aris, ‘Putin’s vision: building a 
greater Europe by 2050’, Business New Europe, 13 Feb. 2015, 
http://www.bne.eu/content/story/moscow-blog-putins-vision-building-greater-europe-2050, 
accessed 5 April 2015. 
33 Sergei Prozorov, Understanding conflict between Russia and the EU: the limits of integration 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
  
consultations between two partners’; instead, the ‘common’ referred to was the position of the 
member states.34 This applied equally to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), 
which was signed in 1994 but did not come into force until 17 December 1997, and also to the 
interim agreement on trade-related matters signed in 1995: ‘Both proved to be inadequate 
bilateral instruments for the purposes of governing the relations between the two sides.’35 
Numerous commentators in Russia were receptive to the argument that an enlarged EU was the 
cornerstone of stability in Europe, but dissenting voices were raised from the start. For example, 
the former Soviet Ambassador to the European Community, Vladimir Shemyatenkov, argued 
that ‘despite all the sweeteners of a partnership{8}, it [EU enlargement] means the actual 
exclusion of Russia (and the Russians) from the zone of peace, stability and prosperity’.36 
Exclusion was certainly not a deliberate EU policy, and indeed extraordinary efforts were made 
to give substance to rhetorical claim of ‘partnership’, including the ‘common spaces’ programme 
of 2004 and the ‘Partnership for Modernisation’ announced in 2010.37 Nevertheless, to this day 
‘the legal framework for the relationship [between the EU and Russia] remains, in some sense, 
unresolved’.38 Equally, the EU failed to socialize the new east European member states into the 
normative foundations of the peace project, and instead some of the new members sought to use 
the EU to pursue longstanding grievances against Russia. Thus conflicts, rather than being 
transformed, were amplified. This applies in particular to the three Baltic states and Poland, who 
brought a range of historical grievances (notably the Katyn massacre of Polish officers and 
reservists in the case of Poland, and extensive ethnic Russian in-migration in the case of Estonia 
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and Latvia) to the EU table.{9} This reinforced the exclusionary logic, which trumped 
partnership policies. The Eastern Partnership (EaP), formally launched in May 2009 on the basis 
of a joint Polish and Swedish initiative, from the first aroused concern in both Brussels and 
Moscow about its potential to generate conflict.39 
This trend culminated in the systematic efforts to keep Russia out of negotiations of the 
Association Agreement (AA) with Ukraine. The ostensible argument was that the AA was a 
bilateral deal and had nothing to do with third parties, even though it would have a profound 
effect on bilateral economic and other relations between Russia and Ukraine. Even Andrew 
Wilson’s panegyric to the Maidan revolution notes that when First Deputy Prime Minister Igor 
Shuvalov travelled to Brussels in February 2013 to try finally to start substantive negotiations, he 
came away empty-handed.40 In structural terms, this represented a failure of ‘inter-regionalism’ 
on a monumental scale.41 The effect of enlargement and association agreements on the 
neighbours of the enlarged EU has been inadequately problematized, as has the quality of the 
political relationship between the EU and its ‘partner’ countries in the borderlands of Europe, 
which has too often taken the form of ‘power projection’.42 Instead of achieving a Europe ‘free 
of new dividing lines’, enlargement effectively created a renewed division of Europe while 
restoring classical imperial tropes of power relations between core and periphery. The realist 
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critique of the EU is certainly far from new,43 but the Ukraine crisis represented a challenge to 
the EU’s survival as a transformative institution with the potential to mitigate the logic of 
conflict on the continent. Early critics of the EU had condemned it as little more than an 
instrument in the Cold War, and their arguments were now restored to the overflowing quiver of 
critiques of the EU. 
Normative rhetoric accompanied by realist practices reinforced an issue that is obscured by the 
categorization of the EU as ‘post-modern’ and post-Westphalian, namely the increasing 
convergence between the EU and NATO. The emergence of a revived Atlanticism is one of the 
salient characteristics of Europe in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, although of course there 
remain tensions between the US and the EU, not least over Ukraine, as well as between EU 
member states. The new Atlanticism is certainly far from being a complete and monolithic 
project, but it is the framework within which the ‘Euro-West’ engages with security matters. The 
very multiplicity of layers makes engagement with outside players complex and confusing. In the 
environment of an increasingly divided continent, this generated numerous security dilemmas 
focusing on Russia. American security initiatives, notably plans to install elements of ballistic 
missile defence (BMD) in eastern Europe, the apparently unstoppable dynamic of NATO 
enlargement, and the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are 
all facets of the security dilemmas exacerbated by the new Atlanticism. While the EU in its 
aspirations is undoubtedly in liberal terms a benign and progressive phenomenon, it is only one 
half of the Atlantic walnut. The other part is NATO, while overarching the two is American 
‘leadership’. Thus the EU may well be post-territorial, but the announcement in April 2007 that 
America planned to build a BMD system in central Europe was a harsh reminder that Europe 
remained firmly part of a spatialized and militarized world order. 
This raises some fundamental questions about the agency of the EU within the framework of a 
complex Euro-Atlantic security system that is becoming a more ramified economic and 
civilizational community in its own right. The EU’s commitment to a bundle of normative public 
goods, including good governance, the rule of law, defensible property rights and genuinely 
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competitive markets and elections is in danger of being vitiated by the manner of their 
implementation. The ‘new’ eastern Europe (NEE), encompassing the three states now directly 
between Russia and the EU, namely Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, along with the three 
republics in the South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, became the source of 
contention. The contradiction lies in the fact that the good governance norms promulgated by the 
EU{10}, while pre-eminently technocratic, have become politicized while lacking an overarching 
normative commitment to the idea of a plural and united Europe. Instead, the commitment is 
increasingly to the new Atlanticism. The absence of a continental vision means that when these 
norms encountered a resistant other, in this case Russia, the norms themselves became 
geopolitical, even if their intent was benign and transformative. This is the essence of the 
structural argument about the breakdown in relations between Russia and the Atlantic 
community. 
Democracy assistance and all the other aspects of partnership between Russia and Atlantic 
institutions lacked a strategic common purpose, such as the commitment to create a ‘new 
Europe’ from ocean to ocean, and instead Russia was asked to reinforce structures that served to 
undermine its identity as a sovereign and equal partner in a common endeavour. Resistance to 
Russia’s perceived self-immolation in structures not of its making had already begun in the 
1990s under Yeltsin, although there was as yet no sustained argument about a structural 
incompatibility of purpose. Under Putin, resistance became increasingly assertive.44 The 
‘transdemocratic’ claim by the EU and NATO that security can be advanced by promoting 
liberal democracy and integration into European institutions became a fundamental issue of 
contention when perceived to take the form of aspirations for ‘regime change’ through the 
practices of colour revolutions. At the heart of the idea of transdemocracy in the European 
context is the coupling of democracy and human rights with the expansion of the Atlantic 
community. The ideology of transdemocracy assumes that if democracy is the best possible form 
of government and the one that is liable to make allies of the states that adopt it [democracy] 
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{11}, then all practicable measures should be employed to achieve the desired end.45 The main 
instrument for this ‘systemic’ approach to the conduct of international politics came to be seen as 
‘colour’ revolutions, mass popular mobilizations against attempts to ‘steal’ elections, whose 
classic exemplar was the events in Ukraine of autumn 2004. The emphasis on democracy 
promotion in George W. Bush’s intervention in Iraq and western support for the civil 
associations active in the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, in Thomas 
Carothers’ words, ‘triggered heightened sensitivities about democracy aid in various places, 
especially Russia and other post-Soviet countries’. Carothers goes on to note that ‘even as the 
color revolutions faded and a new U.S. president [Barack Obama] took a far less assertive stance 
on democracy promotion, the backlash kept growing’.46 
From the perspective of an increasingly confident Russia, the transdemocratic challenge was 
perceived to be a threat of the first order not only to its conception of international politics, but 
above all to the stability of domestic regimes, especially when the ideology of transdemocracy 
was backed up by an extensive network of civil society associations sponsored by the United 
States and European countries. The perception that the West was using democracy promotion as 
a cover to advance its strategic objectives, including regime change, aroused a host of defensive 
reactions.47 The transdemocratic interpenetration of the ideology of democracy and the mailed 
fist of the Atlantic security system was, not surprisingly, perceived as a threat to those on the 
receiving end. These fears were exacerbated by the ‘anti-imperial’ rhetoric of some of the new 
post-communist members of NATO and the EU, and the Russophobic rhetoric of the 
nationalizing elites in Georgia and Ukraine. These fears were inevitably fanned by nationalistic 
radicals of various stripes in Russian public discourse.48 For Russia and other countries, the gripe 
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is not so much with democracy as a practice but its advancement as a project. This is perceived 
to be aggressive, expansionist and ultimately subversive of state sovereignty. Certainly, the 
critique of transdemocracy can be used as a cover for authoritarianism, but the official Russian 
view argues that it is also an appeal for a diverse international order which recognizes alternative 
types of systemic development and ideational pluralism. Resistance to transdemocracy does not 
necessarily in the long term have to be anti-democratic, while recourse to the language of 
‘civilizational’ choice is redolent of the worst forms of orientalism. 
The asymmetrical end of the Cold War, in which the transdemocratic powers asserted victory 
while Russia, unlike Germany or Japan at the end of the Second World War, refused to ‘embrace 
defeat’, generated a cycle of conflict that is far from over.49 An extended period of ‘cold peace’ 
settled over relations between Russia and the West, although punctuated by attempts by both 
sides to escape the logic of renewed confrontation. This is what I call a mimetic Cold War: one 
that reproduced the practices of the Cold War without openly accepting the underlying 
competitive rationale.50 This is a post-ideological Cold War, since the clash is between variants 
of capitalist modernity, intended to achieve ‘a concert of capitalist powers [that] could manage 
competition among integrated but diverse models of political economy’. This would be a 
‘pluralist order’ in which there would be ‘respect for, or at least tolerance of, difference, and a 
willingness to adapt to the realities of power’.51 Instead, increasingly monist representations 
prevailed on both sides, generating a competitive dynamic in European international relations. 
Tensions were fuelled by nationalist elites in some post-communist countries, supported by neo-
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conservatives and liberal interventionists in Washington, who fed concerns about Russia’s 
alleged inherent predisposition towards despotism and imperialism.52{12} This became a self-
fulfilling prophecy: Russia, treated as the enemy, in the end became one. NATO, embedded in an 
increasingly ramified Atlanticist nexus, thus found a new role, which was remarkably similar to 
what it had been set up to do in the first place—to ‘contain’ Russia. 
The structural logic of conflict could theoretically have been avoided by deepening the structures 
and practices of liberal internationalism within the framework of a shared continental vision. John 
Ikenberry correctly notes that ‘China and Russia . . . are not full-scale revisionist powers but part-
time spoilers at best, as suspicious of each other as they are of the outside world’.53 In the event, 
deepening economic relations and the dense structure of the networks of global and regional 
governance did not temper the potential for conflict, as anticipated by the classic postulates of 
interdependency theory.54 Above all, although the EU is based precisely on extending the arc of 
good governance and rule-based economic relations, these principles increasingly became 
enmeshed in competition with Russia. The EU’s normative concerns were in the end trumped by 
the transdemocratic geopolitical aspirations of the new Atlanticism to extend its zone of influence 
to the east. The two sets of purposes became conflated and thus confused. The EU ultimately came 
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into conflict with Russia in a fight over what has now become not the shared but the contested 
neighbourhood of the new eastern Europe. This is not to suggest that the EU should have given up 
on extending its reach to the NEE; however, classic diplomatic mechanisms of accommodation and 
bargaining could have tempered the conflict potential. A clearer articulation of the distinction 
between the European and Atlanticist projects would have helped. Instead, the European 
Commission, especially under the leadership of José Manuel Barroso, became the epitome of 
hermetic insensitivity. Well before the Ukraine crisis, relations between Moscow and the 
Commission had run into a dead end, as evidenced by the failure to establish even a minimal 
consensus over the successor to the PCA after the initially agreed decade ran out in 2007. 
The realist approach to politics, which focuses on interests and issues of national security, would 
have alerted policy-makers to the dangers of advancing into a region replete with its own norms 
and traditions and engaging in an integrative project of its own.55 As John Mearsheimer forcefully 
reminds us, most realists were opposed to NATO expansion, and he recalls George Kennan’s 
strictures on the folly of enlargement.56 Equally, Henry Kissinger stresses that the vitality of an 
international order depends on the balance it strikes between legitimacy and power: both are 
subject to evolution and change, but ‘when that balance is destroyed, restraints disappear, and the 
field is open to the most expansive claims and most implacable actors; chaos follows until a new 
system of order is established’.57 The Versailles settlement, in his view, placed excessive 
emphasis on the legitimacy component and appeals to shared principles, and by ignoring the 
element of power all but dared Germany to embark on revisionism.58 This is a nice description of 
the present European disorder. 
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The new Atlanticism 
A vacuum has opened up where the idea of European unity once stood. On the one side, Russia 
is engaged in its own integrative projects, primarily the Eurasian Economic Union launched on 1 
January 2015, and is turning towards closer ties with Asian powers, notably China. On the other 
side, the Atlantic security community is evolving into a far broader alliance system combining 
security with more intense political and economic ties. The new Atlanticism is evolving into a 
political force that is overcoming the loss of direction and purpose of the early post-Cold War 
years. Having lost its original rationale with the end of the Cold War, the Atlantic community 
cast around for a new purpose, which it initially found by going ‘out of area’ to stop it going ‘out 
of business’. The two and a half decades after the end of the Cold War can now be seen as little 
more than a hiatus in which NATO fought wars in south-east Europe and Afghanistan, but above 
all sought to achieve the impossible: to retain its original Atlantic character by ensuring a 
continuing American commitment to European security, while bringing Russia in as a security 
partner. The efforts devoted to the latter goal were both genuine and intense, but in the end were 
vitiated by the various enlargements that brought the alliance to Russia’s borders, the imposition 
of a missile defence system on European territory, ideational debates about sovereignty and 
autonomy, and the pronounced anti-Russian stance of some of the new members. In the end the 
Atlantic community found its new purpose by returning to a reformulated version of its original 
goal—keeping Russia out. Although challenged by problems of internal coherence, diverging 
ambitions, competing representations of NATO’s ultimate purpose and mission, reluctance to 
meet defence spending commitments and political resistance to the new division of Europe, the 
new Atlanticism is becoming the framework within which these issues are being discussed. 
The ease with which the NATO alliance slipped back into a posture of Cold War confrontation 
with Russia illustrates the increasingly hermetic and comprehensive character of the 
organization. By hermetic I mean that while the security system created in the wake of the 
Second World War II enlarged considerably after 1989, above all to encompass a great swathe of 
former communist Soviet bloc states and even a part of the former Soviet Union (the Baltic 
states), its internal rationale and structures remained remarkably impervious to change despite 
the collapse of the Iron Curtain and Russia’s uncertain path towards capitalist democracy and 
international integration. Russia did not become a fully fledged member of the new security 
community, generating tensions and potential contestations that exploded over Ukraine in 2014. 
  
The Atlantic alliance had always been a distinctly normative enterprise, as formulated in the 
Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941, but when this basis was combined with the transdemocratic 
agenda it assumed an increasingly inflexible ideological character. The Ukraine crisis 
demonstrated a new rigidity in policy and selectivity in understanding complex information 
flows. Above all, the fundamental tension in postwar European development, namely the 
relationship between the European and American wings of the alliance, remains unresolved. 
This is not to argue that separation is appropriate, but to suggest that a debate on the way in 
which Atlanticism can be rendered compatible with a mode of reconciliation at the pan-European 
level would be appropriate. Various ideas have been mooted about how this could be achieved, 
including some sort of Helsinki 2 conference. The new Atlanticists naturally dismiss such ideas 
and have instead advocated ramping up the pressure on Russia through sanctions and other 
measures on Russia. This assumes that applying a linear ‘deterrence model’ to Russia will 
achieve the desired outcome, whereas, as Stephen Walt argues (drawing on the classic ‘security 
dilemma’ idea of Robert Jervis59), a the bundle of insecurities that define Russian actions is more 
accurately defined by a ‘spiral model’.60 A very different approach was taken by Donald Tusk, 
the former Polish prime minister who took over as President of the European Council in 
December 2014. Tusk argued that ‘Europe must maintain broad economic sanctions against 
Russia until Ukraine has regained control of its border or risk a crisis with the White House,’ 
accusing some EU leaders of ‘appeasement’ of Russia and of ‘preferring “naivety or hypocrisy” 
in seeking to give Vladimir Putin the benefit of the doubt’. He called for the full implementation 
of the Minsk 2 agreement of 12 February 2015, including Ukrainian control of its border with 
Russia, before sanctions were eased, but failed to mention that border controls were to be 
restored only after a constitutional process that granted the rebellious regions some sort of agreed 
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autonomy.61 This sort of Atlanticism served only to confirm the death of Europe as the subject of 
its fate. 
There was little scope here for any kind of pan-European process to restructure the European 
security system, whose breakdown was so vividly in evidence in the struggle over Ukraine. 
Russian advocacy of some sort of greater European security system and model of continental 
unification can be interpreted as hostile to existing patterns of transatlantic relations and the EU’s 
model of systemic political transformation of its neighbourhood, but this is precisely the greatest 
challenge. The creation of some sort of greater European structure would potentially foster a 
more benign geopolitical environment in which Russia’s own systemic transformation could take 
place. Although sponsored by Russia today, the greater European project does not belong to 
Russia but is part of the broader European patrimony. The greater European idea offers the 
potential for precisely the missing mode of reconciliation alluded to earlier. However, its 
transformative potential will only be realized if greater Europe become a project for the whole 
continent. 
As for the new Atlanticism’s comprehensive character, this is something that has been gaining in 
intensity in recent years as the foreign and security dimension of the EU has effectively merged 
with the Atlantic security community. Since the Treaty of Lisbon (the ‘Reform Treaty’) of 13 
December 2007, which came into effect in 2009, the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) is now in substance part of an Atlantic system. Accession countries are now required to 
align their defence and security policies with those of NATO, resulting in the effective 
‘militarization’ of the EU. Several articles in the Association Agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine that was to have been signed at the Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership on 28–9 
November 2013 covered security issues, which together would irrevocably draw Ukraine into the 
Atlantic security orbit. Article 4 speaks of the ‘Aims of political dialogue’, with section 1 
stressing that: ‘Political dialogue on all areas of mutual interest shall be further developed and 
strengthened between the Parties. This will promote gradual convergence on foreign and security 
matters with the aim of Ukraine’s ever deeper involvement into the European security area.’ 
Article 7.1 called for EU–Ukrainian convergence in foreign affairs, security and defence. 
                                                 
61 Ian Traynor, ‘Why Europe must not compromise with Kremlin on Ukraine, by man at EU’s 
helm’, Guardian, 16 March 2015, p. 19.  
  
As if this were not explicit enough, article 10 on ‘conflict prevention, crisis management and 
military–technological cooperation’ noted in section 3 that: ‘The parties shall explore the 
potential of military and technological cooperation. Ukraine and the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) will establish close contacts to discuss military capability improvement, including 
technological issues.’ This would not have been a problem if some overarching and mutually 
satisfactory security agreement between Russia and the Atlantic system—what I refer to as a 
potential ‘mode of reconciliation’— had been in place; but, as we have seen, relations between the 
two sides had long been deteriorating. Even the traditional neutrality of some of the countries is 
being questioned, with Atlanticists in both Sweden and Finland exploiting the Ukraine crisis to 
shift their countries closer to NATO. Although security policy-making in the EU even after Lisbon 
remains consensus-based and intergovernmental, the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
sought to generate greater coherence in supporting the work of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.62 In the Ukraine crisis the inaugural holder of this 
post, Catherine Ashton, failed to provide a distinctive voice that could mediate between 
Washington and Moscow or reconcile the various concerns of the member states. The agency of 
the EU in this crisis was found wanting. 
The new Atlanticism has been long in the making and represents the internal transformation of 
the traditional security system into a new type of community. In keeping with its hermetic and 
comprehensive character, the new Atlanticism has effectively made security an exclusive public 
good. If in the past security emerged out of a balance of power or some sort of arrangement 
where different states engage in diplomacy to manage difference (on the lines of the nineteenth-
century Concert of Powers), the new power system guarantees security for its own members and 
allies (although of course to a different degree for the latter), but increasingly lacks a mechanism 
to engage in genuine equilateral security relations with others. This dangerously one-sided 
stance, reinforced by the practices of transdemocracy, replicates the structural exclusion 
mechanism that we noted in EU relations with Russia. All NATO secretaries general in the post-
Cold War era have made sustained efforts to mitigate this mechanism, but all have clearly failed 
to achieve the creation of an inclusive security structure for Europe. There was no way to 
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reconcile the concerns of other states with geopolitical interests that do not coincide with those 
of the Atlantic community; and instead, in the absence of a mode of reconciliation, the logic of 
confrontation steadily increased. 
Russian neo-revisionism 
The dominant narrative of the new Atlanticism is that Russia has become a revisionist power and 
is solely responsible for the breakdown of the European security order. This is a dangerous 
simplification of the complex structural factors that precipitated the confrontation between 
Russia and the Atlantic system, and is likely to lead to mistaken policy responses. Unlike 
interwar Germany, contemporary Russia is not a revisionist power, although it does challenge 
the balance between power and legitimacy instantiated in the post-Cold War European 
settlement. This challenge forced Russia to become what I call a neo-revisionist power, 
questioning neither the basic territorial arrangements of Europe nor even the basic normative 
premises on which contemporary world order is based, but demanding a recognition of Russia’s 
claim to be an equal in that power system and thus a legitimate partner in the stewardship of 
world affairs. America’s claim to be the ‘indispensable power’ is thus questioned, as is the EU’s 
claim to normative tutelage. However, Russia’s initial motivation in both the Georgian and 
Ukrainian conflicts was pre-eminently defensive. Thus the Ukraine crisis, as Andrei Tsygankov 
argues, represented ‘Putin’s last stand’ in his struggle for recognition of Russia’s interests and 
values. He dismisses alternative explanations of Russia’s behaviour that stress Russian 
imperialism, the regime’s ‘diversionary politics’ aimed at distracting attention from domestic 
problems, divergent national identities or Putin’s ressentiment.63 
In the 1990s there was not much that Russia could do about the asymmetrical end of the Cold 
War, since it was economically weak and locked into an extended ‘transition’ period as it 
became something approximating a market economy. Putin’s accession to the presidency in 2000 
coincided with the beginning of an extended period of high prices for raw materials, above all for 
oil and gas. Russia enjoyed annual GDP{13} growth of 8 per cent up to the onset of the great 
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recession from 2008. The Russian state greatly increased its extractive capacities, with tax 
revenues rising on the back of the defeat of the oligarchic model of capitalism in the early 2000s, 
notably through the ‘Yukos affair’ from 2003, which saw the Yukos oil company effectively 
expropriated and transferred into the hands of state-owned Rosneft, while its head, Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, spent a decade in jail. 64 Putin himself stepped down in 2008 after the two terms 
allowed him by the constitution, and for four years the country was governed by the relatively 
liberal Dmitry Medvedev. The latter promised to revive the country’s democratic institutions, 
which had been increasingly suffocated by the system of ‘managed democracy’. Medvedev 
achieved only modest success, but he established an agenda for the reform of the Putinite system 
that remains active to this day.65 When it comes to foreign affairs, according to Dmitri Trenin, 
Medvedev was sent by Putin on ‘a sort of scouting mission to the West to determine what was 
possible to achieve with the United States and Europe. As Putin looked at the balance sheet three 
and a half years later, the results were not promising.’ Putin concluded that ‘the West’s approach 
to Russia offered scant respect for its interests or views’.66 Trenin was already warning a decade 
ago that ‘Russia has a choice between accepting subservience and reasserting its status as great 
power’.67 A thousand years of Russian history determined what that choice would be. 
In the end it was perceived foreign policy threats, notably the western intervention in Libya in 
2011, that ensured Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012. In the UN Security Council vote on 
17 March 2011 establishing a no-fly zone Russia abstained, allowing the western powers to 
overthrow Muammar Gaddafi by October. This was yet another instance of the ‘regime change’ 
that alarmed Russia so much, and that already had provoked an internal ‘tightening of the 
screws’ in the mid-2000s. By the time Putin returned to the presidency in May 2012 Russia was 
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much stronger, and ready to assert itself in world politics. As noted above, in the wake of the 
problems exposed by the Five-Day War in 2008 the Russian armed forces became the object of a 
grand programme of reform and re-equipping. Russia under Putin presented itself not so much as 
anti-western but as the continuation of the ‘genuine’ West (pace Danilevsky, who argued in the 
Slavophile manner that the Slav cultural-historical type was fundamentally incompatible with the 
Franco-German historical type prevalent in Europe68{14}) by other means: one committed to 
conservative values, traditional representations of state sovereignty and a multipolar international 
system—the code for the refusal to accept the hegemony of the Atlantic system.69 However, 
unlike the Slavophiles and their increasingly numerous latter-day adherents in contemporary 
Russia, Putin remains a ‘European’, but one cleaving to a vision of ‘true’ Europe, as opposed to 
the ‘false’ one being purused in the West.70 As Alexey Gromyko, the Director of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences Institute of Europe, puts it: 
<ext>To be a Russian European does not mean to pursue exclusively a pro-Euroatlantic path; or 
a policy of integration into organizations which had been set up. At the same time the foreign 
policy of Russia is permeated with the understanding that the most developed and densely 
populated part of the country is located in Europe; that the last five centuries Russia’s political 
and economic history has been massively linked to this part of the world.71<extend> 
Russia was far from becoming a fully revisionist power since it asserted precisely the defence of 
the UN system and international law that it claimed that the West in its practices subverted, as 
well as defending its European identity. This is a type of ‘neo-revisionism’ that seeks not to 
challenge the fundamentals of international order but to ensure that Russia and other ‘rising’ 
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powers are treated as equals in that system.72 Of course, this is a deeply problematic stance, but it 
is one that is shared in various degrees by Russia’s partners in the BRICS grouping and others 
who are reviving a version of the 1970s idea of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). 
The veteran American diplomat and scholar Chester Crocker is right to point to the larger 
context: ‘The Ukraine crisis did not emerge out of thin air. Its roots go back to the failures of 
Western–Russian diplomacy that left a large hole in the European order, to the venal elite 
networks ruling Kyiv and to the failure of a genuine democratic transformation in Russia 
itself.’73 Russia undoubtedly ‘broke the rules’ in 2014 when it incorporated Crimea.74 These 
were the rules that Moscow claims were repeatedly breached by the West, as Putin claimed in his 
spirited defence of Russian actions over Crimea on 18 March 2014: ‘They say that we are 
violating norms of international law. First, it’s a good thing that they at least remember that there 
exists such a thing as international law—better late than never.’75 It was the West, in his view, 
that had become revisionist, flouting international law whenever it suited its purposes, as in the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, which Putin, together with France and Germany, vigorously opposed. 
However, contrary to much commentary, this did not signal the emergence of full-scale 
revisionism. That would have entailed the substantive repudiation of the operative structure of 
international law and the existing territorial arrangements. Instead, Putin spent most of his 
leadership trying to consolidate the existing borders and state system. A series of treaties with 
neighbours stabilized the existing borders, reflecting the deep conservatism of the Putin system. 
This is why the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008, and its swift 
recognition by a number of leading Atlantic powers, represented such an affront to his way of 
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thinking. Each case is indeed different, but Russia’s actions in Crimea were in part justified by 
the earlier precedent.76 The re-acquisition of Crimea was a response to what was perceived to be 
a substantive security threat—above all, the loss of access to the Sevastopol naval base. As the 
former British Ambassador to Russia, Tony Brenton, puts it: ‘The seizure of Crimea and support 
for insurgency in east Ukraine were illegal and destabilising, but they were a response to a 
unique set of historical and political circumstances.’77 All of this represents a neo-revisionist 
response to what were perceived to be threats, and to that degree represented a refusal to accept 
the status of a subaltern; but it does not represent a repudiation of the existing system of 
international relations or a sustained attempt to regain territory. 
Russia is no longer the acquiescent partner of the early post-Cold War years. The experience of 
over two decades of traumatic domestic and international turmoil rendered both the Russian elite 
and Russian society ready to challenge western hegemony. This mood runs far deeper than the 
alleged effects of ‘Putinite propaganda’ in the mass media.78 Although Putin is held personally 
responsible for the breakdown in relations with the West, his views in fact reflect the deeper 
changes in Russian society over the past two decades. Igor Bunin and Aleksei Makarkin describe 
four long-term trends in Russia that underline the increasing alienation between Russia and the 
West: the strong sense of national self-sufficiency, complemented by a commitment to the 
country’s Great Power status and leading role in the world; a strong sense of historical 
continuity, despite the numerous ruptures, based on statism and a sense of social justice; a deeply 
ingrained fear of loss of territory, perceived as a type of spiritual catastrophe; and finally, an 
emphasis on conspirological readings of public affairs. The idealization of the West 
characteristic of the perestroika and early post-communist periods is unlikely to return soon. 
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Putin’s attempts to establish a new relationship with the West based on equality represented a 
unique window of opportunity, but this has now been lost. Putin’s view that the West is no 
longer a viable partner is shared by the population.79 This suggests the onset of a sustained 
period of confrontation, but it is one that was entirely avoidable. 
 
The strange death of Europe 
The Ukraine crisis exposed the flaws in Europe’s post-Cold War development. The many 
dimensions of the EU’s internal crisis have been discussed elsewhere,80 accompanied by a 
growing consensus that while the EU in its traditional form may be doomed, some form of 
‘deeper Europe’ will thrive.81 In the Ukraine crisis the EU not only proved inadequate as a 
conflict regulator but itself became the source of conflict. The EU’s ill-prepared advance into 
what was always recognized to be a contested neighbourhood provoked the gravest international 
crisis of our era, but once the crisis started Europe was sidelined. The drift towards merger with 
the Atlantic security system left the EU bereft of actor autonomy and policy instruments when it 
really mattered—when the issue was maintaining peace on the European continent. The Russian 
Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, repeatedly expressed surprise at how little autonomy Europe 
really enjoyed when it came to the big decisions about the fate of the continent. He recalled the 
statement by US Vice-President Joe Biden that the American leadership had had to cajole Europe 
into imposing sanctions on Russia, even though the EU had initially been opposed to such 
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measures.82 Lavrov noted ‘that we for some previous years overestimated the independence of 
the European Union and even big European countries. So, it’s geopolitics.’83 At the same time, 
he called for the ‘integration of integrations’ between the EU and the EEU to create the 
foundations of the greater Europe.84 
From a realist perspective, of course, there is no reason for the United States and its allies to 
accord Russia the status that it demands. Angela Stent’s study of Russo-American relations in 
the post-Cold War period examines precisely how the mismatch in perceptions played out in 
practice, with Russia determined to ignore the enormous asymmetry in power and status, and 
America trying to find ways to deal with its assertive partner while ensuring its own freedom of 
action.85 However, the fundamental normative claim of the EU is that it seeks to transcend this 
realist logic, and it certainly devotes considerable effort to doing so. Unfortunately, when it came 
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to dealing with the new eastern Europe, a geopolitical dynamic became apparent. In part this was 
a response to Russia’s own claims of a certain droit de regard over the region; but there were 
others drivers at work, not least the changing character of EU policy as a result of the various 
accessions, but above all the lack of a strategic greater European vision. 
The EU is not organizationally geared up for geopolitical contestation, and thus during the 
Ukraine crisis it soon took the back seat to a power that is precisely configured to wage 
geopolitical struggles on a global scale. The Ukraine crisis exposed the EU’s lack of coherent 
agency and significant underinstitutionalization when it came to the big questions of European 
security. The EEAS was woefully understaffed as it grappled with the Ukrainian crisis in 2013–
14, and Ashton, despite her best endeavours, failed to articulate a specifically European approach 
to the crisis. Only from 1 November 2014, with the appointment of Federica Mogherini as the 
new High Representative and Vice-President in the Jean-Claude Juncker Commission, was the 
EEAS organizationally remoulded and the Ukrainian desk significantly bolstered. Mogherini 
launched a review of the Eastern Partnership as well as the European security strategy, which 
had originally been formulated by Javier Solana over a decade earlier. This was accompanied by 
a discussion about the degree to which the EU needed to think more ‘geopolitically’, although it 
was not clear how this was to be defined. If it meant a realist engagement with the world as it is 
rather than the transdemocratic anticipation of a reality yet to be created, then traditional forms 
of diplomacy and bargaining could be restored. However, if it meant more explicit contestation 
for influence over the neighbourhood, then the era of conflict will continue. 
One of the fundamental questions facing the EU as it examined its handling of the Ukraine crisis 
was the degree to which its norms of peace and development had been subverted by its lack of 
autonomy from its geopolitical ally. The question was posed in the sharpest terms possible: had 
the geopolitical logic of Atlanticism trumped the normative ‘post-modern’ aspirations of the EU? 
The United States is concerned to maintain its global leadership as the defender of the norms of 
liberal internationalism and to ensure that challenges to its leadership throughout the world are 
negated.86 These are classic geopolitical goals, although couched in the language of liberal 
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universalism. Whether US leadership is ultimately capable of delivering the international public 
goods which justify its claims to hegemonic leadership is a question this article does not address, 
although clearly a growing bloc of countries are uncomfortable not so much with American 
claims as with the typically cack-handed and destructive manner of their assertion. A similar 
argument can now be applied to the EU. The EU was originally established for very different 
purposes, namely to restore the nation-states devastated at the end of the Second World War and 
to ensure that they never again came into conflict with one another.87 This the EU has achieved 
in a spectacularly successful manner, while mostly respecting the autonomy of the member 
states.88 However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the associated end of the Cold 
War, it was confronted by an even greater challenge. This was to find a way to achieve the 
political unification of the continent, now made up of areas with enormously different levels of 
development and historical experiences. 
Although flanked by the Council of Europe and the OSCE, the EU remains the pre-eminent 
organization representing the new Europe. While beset more than ever by numerous problems, 
including the economic consequences of monetary union, the loss of trust by its own citizens and 
the increasingly unbalanced predominance of Germany, the EU remains the most successful 
regional integration association in human history. The fundamental paradox is that a body that 
has ‘Europe’ in its name has increasingly lacked a European vision. It came to see its own 
enlargement as the answer to the problems of Europe, rather than considering ways in which it 
could contribute to the resolution of the problems facing Europe as one actor among many. This 
solipsistic introspection reinforced the hermeticism of the new Atlanticism. Enlargement 
inevitably came up against two major problems: the lack of infinite elasticity of EU institutions; 
and the EU’s failure to devise a genuinely continental programme of unification. The latter 
would have required some imaginative rethinking of European architecture and normative 
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practices to ensure that the transformative role of the EU could be adapted to new circumstances. 
Instead, the single-minded focus on the EU as the supreme representation of a monist vision of 
wider Europe in the end provoked division and war. 
Thus Europe is now faced by two fundamental interlocking challenges. The first is the crisis in 
the internal development of the EU and its identity, seen at its sharpest in the attempt to manage 
the tensions and contradictions provoked by the establishment of monetary without fiscal union, 
as well as widespread popular disillusionment with the idea of European integration in its 
entirety accompanied by the rise of various populist challenges.89 European publics have simply 
not been given a coherent answer to the question about what the EU is for in conditions of its 
effective absorption into the Atlantic alliance system. This is not to say that there are not good 
answers, but they need to be articulated as answers not to Atlantic but to European problems. 
Equally, as Maxine David notes: ‘The EU cannot escape the fact that Russia does not perceive it 
in benign terms and this must guide its policy response.’ The ‘need to reconceptualise the EU–
Russia relationship . . . will require the EU to look beyond its dominant ideological inclinations’. 
She stresses that this does not mean granting Russia an effective veto over EU affairs or the 
repudiation of its normative foundations, but it does mean that ‘the EU should continue to offer 
space for dialogue’, including consideration of whether the existing ‘European security 
architecture, of which the EU is part, is fit for purpose and whether it is overly inclusive or 
exclusive’.90 
This leads us to the second fundamental crisis, the geopolitical one. This has long been brewing, 
but in recent years has been overshadowed by the crisis of identity, purpose and coherence of the 
EU itself. In geographical terms, Europe has now entered the long-anticipated finalité, facing a 
crisis of enlargement in Turkey, in the Balkans and above all in the contested borderlands 
between the Baltic and the Black Sea. Although negotiations for the EU–Ukraine Association 
Agreement were begun in 2007, before the Eastern Partnership had taken shape, confrontation 
over its regional implications ultimately represented a spectacular failure to establish a 
framework for interregional cooperation and engagement. As the House of Lords report into EU–
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Russia relations puts it, there was a high degree of ‘sleep-walking’ into the crisis, member states 
being taken by surprise by the turn of events.91 Unlike most previous accession countries, 
Ukraine enjoyed no demonstrable national consensus in favour of the Atlanticist turn, with a 
significant part of the population seeking to retain historic links with Russia. The issue is not so 
much Ukraine’s sovereign choice to decide, as that this choice does not take place in a vacuum. 
Societal divisions were not given adequate political expression as the polity experienced a 
catastrophic breakdown, and the inherent pluralism of the country was reduced to some binary 
assertions, which today have become even starker. 
Instead of Russia becoming a member of NATO or the dissolution of NATO to create a new 
military and political alliance with Russia as a founding member, the original Atlantic alliance 
advanced to Russia’s borders. A monist logic came to predominate in Moscow, Brussels and 
Washington, with an entirely predictable outcome. Regarding the EU, Kissinger notes that: ‘The 
European Union must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the 
strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe contributed 
to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.’92 This 
region is far from being a ‘vacuum’; it is a zone in which existing regional affiliations are 
strongly entrenched. Even though Ukraine had never formally ratified the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) Charter, the country benefited greatly from its public goods—visa-free 
travel, labour mobility, cross-border pension payments and much else—and ultimately from the 
intensification of the CIS free trade zone. Even the most benign regime in Moscow would expect 
substantive ‘interregional’ negotiations to mediate the shift in strategic orientation of the new 
eastern Europe as it became an area of shared involvement with the EU. Instead, there was no 
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serious dialogue over these issues, while ideas for complementary and inclusive models for 
European development were too often dismissed as attempts to split the Atlantic system. 
The cold peace that dominated European politics for the quarter-century following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 represented a type of mimetic Cold War, in which the structures and 
attitudes of the Cold War were perpetuated, although recognition of the fact was suppressed 
under a cloud of well-meaning but ultimately divisive rhetoric. Equally, the EU ultimately 
stumbled into geopolitical competition with Russia while suppressing recognition of the ‘power’ 
logic of its actions. Ukraine was divided internally and located along Europe’s traditional 
historical fault-lines, but adroit diplomacy of the traditional ‘realist’ kind could have averted the 
crisis. The EU suppressed recognition of its own geopolitical ambitions, couching its advance in 
the language of regulation, good governance and normative institutions. These are important and 
fundamental goods, but their assertion without recognition of the internal and external 
complexities of the target country represents geopolitical nihilism of the highest order. This 
nihilism was couched in the language of an amorphous Atlanticism that, like the mimetic Cold 
War, displaced responsibility to what has now become the hermetic ideology of transdemocracy, 
where democratic advance is associated with subordination to the security structures of the new 
Atlanticism. The EU is in danger of being subsumed into the new Atlanticism, thereby losing its 
autonomous sense of purpose and responsibility. Instead of advancing the peaceful integration of 
Europe on a clearly articulated pan-continental basis, the EU became the unwitting instrument 
for new dividing lines across the continent. The Europe born of the end of the Cold War has 
died, but a new Europe combining its Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian identities is waiting to be 
born. 
